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SYLLABUS

OF

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LOCKE'S ESSAY

ON THE

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

Non fumum ex fulgore, sed ex fumo dare lucem
Cognitat, ut speciosa dehinc miracula promat.

Not smoke from fire, but from a cloud of smoke,
His fire quick lighten'd and his wonders broke.
HORACE.

THE SIXTH EDITION.

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A
SYLLABUS, &c.

BOOK I.

IT is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings; it is then a subject even for its nobleness worth our inquiry into, though attended with some difficulty; for, like the eye, whilst it make us see, and perceive all other things, it takes no notice of itself. C 1. S 1.

The purpose of the work is to enquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, C 1. S 2:

The bounds between opinion, and knowledge, must be sought out, and the measure in things whereof we have no certainty, examined.—This is the method of the work. C 1. S. 3.

Idea is the object of thinking, and is used to express whatever is meant by the words phantasm, notion, species, &c. C 1. S 8.

There are no innate principles in the mind, because it can be shown how we come by all, or any part of knowledge. C 2. S 1.

The mind is first of all furnished with ideas through the medium of the senses, which being abstracted, supply it with the use of general names. C 2. S 15.

A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he come to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then upon ex plaining those words, he presently assents to, or rat perceives the truth of that proposition. C 2. S 16.

If general maxims were innate, they would app in children, ideots, savages and illiterate persons; that is not the case. C 2. S 27.

There are no innate practical principles, beca none universal. C 3. S 1.

Faith and justice are not owned as principles by C 3. S 2.

Moral rules are not innate, because they need a pr C 3. S 4.

Virtue is generally approved because it is profita not because it is innate. C 3. S 6.

Few men make the rule of virtue the internal p ciple of action. C 3. S 7.

Principles are not innate, unless their ideas be inn C 4. S 1.

If identity be a native impression inquired:—Whet a man being a creature consisting of soul and body, the same man when his body is changed: whet Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having the same soul, w the same man. C 4. S 4.

We have no innate idea of God; the people of dania have no idea whatever of a God. C 4. S 12.

The ideas of a God are various in different n C 4. S 13.

As the idea of a God is not innate, nothing else possibly be so. C 4. S 17.

The difference of men's discoveries, depends u *the different* applications of their faculties. C 4. S

Want of sufficient examination, gave rise to the *ion that* ideas were innate. C 4. S 24.

BOOK II.

Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. C 1. S 2.

Our senses conversant about particular sensible objects, convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to the various ways wherein those objects affect them.—This source of our ideas is called sensation. C 1. S 3.

Another source of our ideas is, the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, totally unconnected with the objects of sense.—This is called reflection. C 1. S 4.

All the ideas we have, are either from sensation or reflection. C 1. S 5.

Ideas of reflection, come later into the mind than those of sensation, because they need attention. C 1. S 8.

The soul begins to have ideas, when it begins to perceive. C 1. S 9.

It is not necessary for the soul always to think: the perception of ideas is to the soul, what motion is to the body, not its essence but one of its operations. C 1. S 10.

If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, his soul and his body must be two distinct persons. C 1. S 12.

If persons without dreaming think when they are asleep, their ideas are got by sensation or reflection. C 1. S 16.

In the reception of simple ideas, the understanding is for the most part passive. C 1. S 25.

One thing is carefully to be observed concerning our ideas, (viz.) that some of them are simple, and some complex: a simple idea is an uniform, uncompounded appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas. C 2. S 1.

When the undertanding is once stored with simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas; but it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or understanding, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned. C 2. S 2.

The ideas we receive from sensation are divided into four classes. First. Those which come in the mind by one sense only, as colours, sounds, smells, &c.

Secondly. Those that come into the mind by more senses than one, as space, extension, figure, rest, and motion. Thirdly. Those that are had from reflection only. Fourthly. Those that come into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection. C 3. S 1.

The idea of solidity is got by the touch, and arises from the resistance of body, to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses till it has left it. C 4. S 1.

Solidity fills space so as to exclude all other solid substances, and hinders two bodies approaching each other in a strait line from ever touching, unless it is removed from between them, in a line not parallel to *that which they* move in. C 4. S 2.

The difference between solidity and space is that the latter when between two bodies, will allow them to touch if moved towards each other, which the former will not. C 4. S 3.

Solidity differs from hardness, which is only a firm cohesion of the parts of matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its figure.

Water is as solid as adamant: an experiment was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold, filled with water, which when screwed down tight, sooner than be compressed into smaller compass exuded through the pores of that very close metal. C 4. S 4.

The extension of body is the cohesion, or continuity of solid, separable, moveable parts: the extension of space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immoveable parts. C 4. S 5.

Simple ideas of reflection are the operations of the mind about its other ideas. C 6. S 1.

The two great and principal actions of the mind are perception, or thinking, volition, or willing : the power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will, and these two powers are denominated faculties. C 6. S 2.

The simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind, by all the ways of sensation and reflection, are pleasure, or delight, pain, or uneasiness, power, existence, unity. C 7. S 1.

Pleasure and pain, whether in reference to the mind, or body, signifies every thing that delights or molests us. C 7. S 2.

The idea of unity is got from every object without, *and every idea* within. C 7. S 7.

The idea of power is got from the motion of our own bodies. Also by the effects which natural bodies are able to produce in one another. C 7. S 8.

The idea of succession is got from the observance of our ideas, flowing in a train without any intermission. C 7. S 9.

Positive ideas sometimes arise from private causes. C 3. S 1.

We may be said to see darkness; we may see the figure of a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected. C 8. S 6.

The power there is in any body to produce particular ideas, is a quality in that body. C 8. S 8.

Primary qualities in bodies are those which are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be, (viz.) solidity, extension, figure, motion, rest, and number. C 8. S 9.

Secondary qualities are powers to produce various sensations in us, by their primary qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes. There are likewise qualities of a third sort, as the power of fire to warm or burn. C 8. S 10.

Primary qualities in bodies produce the ideas of them by impulse. C 8. S 11.

The ideas of secondary qualities, are produced by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. C 8. S 13.

Ideas of primary qualities are resemblances, secondary are not. C 8. S 15.

The third sort of qualities neither are resemblances, nor are they thought to be so. C 8. S 24.

The reason why secondary are taken for real qualities *is,* that we have not organs nice enough to perceive e *primary* ones latent in bodies, on which they depend; yet observing there is no resemblance in the quality produced, with the things producing it in qualities of the third sort, we look upon that as the bare effect of power. C 8. S 25.

Perception is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas, and is by some called—thinking in general. C 9. S 1.

There is only perception where the mind receives an impression. C 9. S 2.

Children have some few ideas in the womb, as hunger, warmth, &c. but they are not innate. C 9. S 5.

The ideas which are first imprinted on the mind, are those which happen to be the first sensible qualities that occur. C 9. S 7.

The ideas we receive by sensation are often in grown people altered by the judgment without our taking notice of it.

When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, (viz.) gold, alabaster, or jet, the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle variously shaded, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light, by difference of the sensible figures of bodies; the judgment presently by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes. A man born blind, who knows by the touch a sphere from a cube, would not, if he received his sight, be able to distinguish one from the other. C 9. S 8.

This alteration is most common in the ideas received by sight. C 9. S 9.

The faculty of perception is that which draws the line between the animal and vegetable kingdom. C 9. S 11.

Perception being the first step towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it, the fewer senses a man hath, and the fewer and duller the impressions are that are made by them, the more remote is he from that knowledge which is to be found in some men. C 9. S 15.

The next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progress towards knowledge, is called retention, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways. First. By contemplation, or the keeping an idea any time in view. C 10. S 1.

Secondly. By memory, or the reviving any ideas which have disappeared. C 10. S 2.

Attention and repetition help much towards the fixing any ideas in the memory; but those which at first make the deepest and most lasting impression are those accompanied with pleasure or pain. C 10. S 3.

Ideas that are constantly repeated are scarcely ever lost, as those of solidity, extension, heat, and cold, &c. C 10. S 6.

In viewing the ideas that are lodged in the memory, the mind is often active, it depending on the will to bring forward those dormant pictures. C 10. S 7.

There are two defects of the memory; oblivion, and slowness, which last, if great, is stupidity. C 10. S 8.

Brutes have memory, a bird will remember a tune that it has been taught. C 10. S 10.

Discerning is the perception of two ideas to be the *e or different.* C 11. S 1.

Wit lies in the assemblage of ideas, and putting them together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy. Judgment on the contrary lies in separating carefully one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity, to take one thing for another. C 11. S 2.

Ideas when clear prevent all confusion. C 11. S 3.

All ideas of relation depend upon comparison. C 11. S 4.

Brutes compare but very imperfectly. C 11. S 5.

Composition is the adding together several simple ideas, and combining them into compound ones. C 11. S 6.

Brutes compound but very little. A bitch will be as fond of young foxes when they suck her as of her own puppies. C 11. S 8.

When ideas have by repeated sensations got fixed in the memory, the use of names is got and applied to them. C 11. S. 8.

Abstraction is the taking particular ideas, from particular bodies, and making them stand for general ones. C 11. S 9.

Brutes possess not at all the power of abstraction. C 11. S 10.

The difference between an ideot and a madman is, the one puts wrong ideas together, but argues and reasons right from them; the other makes few or no propositions, and argues scarce at all. A distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference, requires suitable attendance, respect, and obedience. C 11. S [illegible]

Complex ideas are made by the mind out of simple ones. 1st. By the composition of simple ideas. 2dly. By the comparison of any two ideas whether simple or complex. 3dly. By abstraction. C 12. S 1.

Complex ideas are made voluntarily; the mind can by its own power put together those ideas it has, and make new complex ones which it never received so united. C 12. S 2.

Complex ideas are divided into three sorts, modes, substances, and relations. C 12. S 3.

A mode is a complex idea which however compounded does not contain the supposition of subsisting by itself, but is considered as a dependency on, or affection of, substances, as triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. C 12. S 4.

A repetition of the same simple idea makes a simple mode. A composition of simple ideas of several kinds makes a mixed mode. C 12. S 5.

Ideas of substances are either single or collective, as a man, a sheep, an army of men, a flock of sheep. C 12. S 6.

Relation consists in the comparing one idea with another. C 12. S 7.

The different modifications of any one simple idea, are as distinct as any two ideas can possibly be. C 13. S 1.

We get the idea of space by our sight and touch. C 13. S 2.

Space considered barely as length between any two beings is called distance; if considered in regard to length, breadth, and thickness, capacity. C 13. S 3.

The power of adding together any parts of space, *the idea of immensity*. C 13. S 4.

Figure is the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have amongst themselves. C 13. S 5.

Place is a relative term, something else must either be specified or implied. C 13. S 7.

Extension and body differ; the first includes no solidity nor resistance to the motion of body, which the latter always does. C 13. S 12.

The parts of pure space are inseparable one from another. C 13. S 13.

The parts of pure space are immoveable, which follows from their inseparability. Motion being nothing but the change of distance between any two things. C 13. S 14.

The power of annihilation proves a vacuum. C 13. S 22.

Motion proves a vacuum. C 13. S 23.

The idea of duration is got from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. C 14. S 1.

The idea of succession is not got from motion, of which the mind takes no notice if it does not produce a continued train of distinguishable ideas. A man becalmed at sea, out of sight of land in a fair day, may look on the sun, or sea, or ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either; though it be certain that two, and perhaps all of them have moved, during that time a great way. C 14. S. 6.

There are certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of the succession of our ideas, which if exceede are imperceptible. C 14. S 9.

We cannot perceive the succession of a cannon ba on account of its quickness. C 14. S 10.

Nor that of hands of clocks, or shadows of sun dials, on account of their slowness. C 14. S 11.

It is impossible to keep one idea a long time unvaried in the mind. C 14. S 13.

Time is the measure of duration. C 14. S 17.

No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal, because they cannot be brought together to be compared. C 14. S 18.

The annual and diurnal revolutions of the sun, and moon, are the most proper measures of time, as being more constant and regular than any thing else, and not from any idea of motion they contain. C 14. S 19.

The mind having acquired a measure of time can apply it to duration before time. C 14. S 25.

The idea of eternity is got by the addition of certain lengths of duration. C 14. S 28.

The idea of time in general is got by considering any part of infinite duration as set out by periodical measures. C 14. S 32.

Duration and expansion are both capable of greater and less lengths; as an hour, or day, an inch, or foot. C 15. S 1.

Expansion is boundless. C 15. S 2.

Duration is boundless. The mind having got the idea of any part of it, can multiply it *in infinitum*. C 15. S 3.

The idea of infinite duration is easier admitted, than the idea of infinite expansion, because the one is considered as an attribute of matter, the other an attribute of God. C 15. S 4.

Time in general is to duration, what place is to *expansion, a landmark* to denote the position of finite real *in respect to* one another. C 15. S 5.

When and *where*, have reference to all finite existences, and are always reckoned in relation to certain epochs, and known parts of the sensible world. C 15. S 8.

All the parts of extension, are extension: and all the parts of duration, are duration. C 15. S 9.

Expansion and duration have this agreement, that though they are considered by us as having parts, those parts are not separable, not even in thought. C 15. S 10.

Duration is as a line, expansion as a solid. C 15. S 11.

Duration has no two parts together, expansion altogether. C 15. S 12.

Number is the simplest and most universal idea. C 16. S 1.

Its modes are made by addition. C 16. S 2.

The simple modes of number are of all others the most distinct. C 16. S 3.

Therefore demonstrations in number the most precise. C 16. S 4.

Distinct names conduce to well reckoning. C 16. S 6.

Number measures every thing capable of measurement. C 16. S 8.

The idea of infinity, is got by the addition of any lengths of space. C 17. S 3.

By the addition of any lengths of duration, the idea of eternity is got. C 17. S 5.

Except space, duration, and number, no other ideas are capable of infinity, because not made up of parts. C 17. S 6.

There cannot be an idea of the infinity of space, for that would be to fix a standing measure to a growing bulk, but there may be an idea of space infinite, which only implies the negation of an end. C 17. S 7.

Matter is infinitely divisible, the division of it being the addition of new numbers. C 17. S 12.

The idea of infinity is negative. C 17. S 13.

Our idea of that part of infinity which we can measure, is positive. C 17. S 15.

Supposed positive ideas of infinity, are the ground of many perplexities and contradictions. C 17. S 21.

Every articulate word is a different modification of sound. C 18. S 3.

The modes of taste are compounded of simple ideas of that sense, but having no names cannot be set down. C 18. S 3.

Some modes have not names known to people in general, because they are not conversant with them, as *Colshire, Drilling, Filtration; Cohobation ;* terms unknown to those whose particular employments do not frequently suggest them to their thoughts. C 18. S 7.

An external object suggests the idea of sensation which is the entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. Whenever any idea recurs without the operation of the same object, it is remembrance ; if it be sought after by the mind and found, it is recollection ; if kept when found, contemplation. C 19. S 1.

There are various degrees of attention in thinking, from dreaming to extreme intension. C 19. S 3.

Pleasure and pain are simple ideas and cannot therefore be defined. C 20. S 1.

Good and evil is only in reference to pleasure and pain : whatever increases pleasure or diminishes pain, is good. Whatever increases pain or diminishes pleasure is evil. C 20. S 2.

Love is the reflection upon the thought a man has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce to him. C 20. S 4.

Hatred is the thought of the pain which any thing present or absent is apt to produce. C 20. S 5.

Desire is the uneasiness a man finds in himself upon absence of any thing whose present enjoyment carries the ideas of delight with it. C 20. S 6.

Joy is the delight of the mind from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good. C 20. S 7.

Sorrow is uneasiness in the mind upon the thought of a good lost, which might have been enjoyed longer, or the sense of a present evil. C 20. S 8.

Hope is that pleasure of the mind which every one finds in himself upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight. C 20. S 9.

Fear is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of a future evil likely to befall us. C 20. S 10.

Despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good. C 20. S 11.

Anger is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge. C 20. S 12.

Envy is an uneasiness of mind caused by the consideration of a good which we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us. C 10. S 13.

All the above mentioned passions, except envy and anger, are possessed by every one. C 26. S 14.

By pleasure and pain is meant every delight, or uneasiness that is felt. C 20. S 15.

In reference to the passions, the removing or lessening a pain operates as a pleasure, and the loss or diminution of a pleasure as a pain. C 20. S 16.

Shame is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or which will lessen us in the esteem of others. C 20. S 17.

By observing the change of ideas from the impression of outward objects, and considering that the same change will again take place from the same object, the idea of power is got. Thus we say: fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has a power to be melted. C 21. S 1.

There are two sorts of power, *active* and *passive;* the idea of the former is got from God, and spirit. C 21. S 2.

Power like most other ideas, includes in it some relation to action, or change. C 21. S 3.

The idea of passive power is got from things inanimate, such as the motion of a billiard ball, when impelled forwards. C 21. S 4.

The power which the mind has to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it, is called the will; the actual exercise of that power, volition. C 21. S 5.

Every one finds in himself a power to begin or forbear any action; hence arise the ideas of liberty and necessity. C 21. S 7.

Liberty is the doing or forbearing any thing in our power. C 21. S 8.

Liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, but to the *person having* the power of doing or forbearing to do according as the mind shall chuse or direct. C 21. S 10.

Voluntary is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary. C 21. S 11.

Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought, there necessity takes place. C 21. S 13.

There is no such thing as *free will*; it is an inconsistent term. C 21. S 14.

Power belongs to agents; the will is a power, and freedom a power; so that to ask whether the *will* has *freedom*, is to ask whether one power has another power. C 21. S 16.

In all proposals of present action, the question about liberty is not whether the will be free, but whether a man be free. C 21. S 21.

As a man in all things must have a preference, in respect to willing he is not free. C 21. S 23.

Freedom consists in dependence of the existence, or non-existence of any action upon our volition of it, and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary on our preference. C 21. S 27.

Will and desire must not be confounded in our minds as they are frequently in direct opposition to each other. C 21. S 30.

Uneasiness determines the will. C 21. S 31.

Desire and uneasiness are synonimous terms. C 21. S 35.

The greatest positive good does not determine the will, because the absence of it is not accompanied by the greatest uneasiness. C 21. S 35.

As we are capable but of one denomination of the will to one action at once, the removal of the present uneasiness is the first step towards happiness. C 21. S 36.

Uneasiness alone being present, is a further reason why it should determine the will. C 21. S 37.

Happiness in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain. C 21. S 42.

Due consideration, and the examination of a good proposed, raises uneasiness or desire in our minds in proportion to the value of that good. C 21. S 46.

The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire, is the source of consideration; and in this consideration consists the liberty man has. C 21. S 47.

The determination of our judgment is the end, and use of liberty. C 21. S 48.

The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general the more are we free from any necessary determination of our will to any particular action. C 21. S 51.

The same thing does not appear equally good to all men, which accounts for their different pursuits. C 21. S 54.

Men chuse evil by a too hasty choice imposing on themselves wrong measures of good and evil. C 21. S 56.

Our judgment of present good and evil is always right. C 21. S 58.

A man may so conform his habits to things as to like, or dislike almost any thing. C 21. S 69.

All original ideas may be reduced to the following; viz. Extension, solidity, mobility, perceptivity, or the *power of* thinking, motivity, or the power of moving, *existence,* duration, number. C 21. S 73.

A mixed mode is made up of scattered and independent ideas, put together by the mind. C 22. S 1.

It seems at first sight strange that a mixed mode which is made up of a number of simple ideas should have unity; that unity consists in the name. C 22. S 4.

Mixed modes have the appearance most in their names of a constant and lasting existence. C 22. S 8.

The ideas of mixed modes are had three ways; by experience and observation, by invention, by the explanation of unknown actions or notions. The mixed mode which the word *lie* stands for is made up of these simple ideas. 1. Articulate sounds. 2. Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those ideas. 4. Those signs put together by affirmation or negation otherwise than the ideas they stand for, are, in the mind of the speaker. C 22. S 9.

The idea of substance is made by considering the simple qualities of a thing joined, in some unknown substratum. C 23. S 1.

We have ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of simple ideas as by experience we find to exist in those particular substances: As, spirit is a thing capable of thinking: hardness, friability and power to draw iron, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. C 23. S 3.

As we have no idea of the substance of body, the idea of spirit is as clear as that of body; the one being (without knowing what it is) supposed to be the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations which we experiment in ourselves within. C 23. S 5.

The secondary qualities of bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts. Blood appears to the naked eyes all red, but by a good microscope wherein its lesser parts appear, shews only some few globules of red swimming in pellucid liquor. C 23. S 11.

The primary ideas we have peculiar to body, as contradistinguished to spirit, are the cobesion of solid and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse. C 23. S 17.

The ideas we have peculiar to spirit are thinking and will, and which is consequent to it—liberty. C 23. S 28.

In comparing the ideas of body and spirit, we find that the substance of both is equally unknown to us; we have clear ideas of two primary qualities of body, viz. solid coherent parts and impulse; we have likewise clear ideas of two primary qualities of spirit; thinking and a power of action. C 23. S 30.

By the power of composition, the mind makes collective ideas of substances, as army, world, &c. C 24. S 2.

Relation is the setting one thing by another, and carrying the view from one to the other. The idea of *Cajus* as a white man is positive, but when considered as an husband relative, another person being intimated, and when given the name *Whiter*, another thing is understood. C 25. S 1.

A change of relation may take place without any change in the subject. *Cajus* whom I consider to day as a father ceases to be so to morrow, only by the death of his son. C 35. S 5.

There can be relation only between two things. *C 25. S 6.*

The ideas of relation are often clearer, than of the subjects related. Comparing two men in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect *idea* of man. C 25. S 8.

In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we perceive that many qualities and substances begin to exist from the operation of some other beings; hence we get our ideas of cause and effect. That which produces any simple or complex idea, we call cause, and that which is produced, effect. Thus finding that the substance which we call wax, is made fluid by heat, we call the simple idea of heat in the relation to the fluidity of wax, cause, and fluidity the effect. C 26. S 1.

Time and place are the foundations of large relations. C 26. S 3.

Almost all absolute terms stand for relations. C 26. S 6.

We have the ideas but of three sorts of substances. 1. God. 2. Finite Intelligencies. 3. Bodies. Of the identity of God on account of his eternity, unalterableness, and ubiquity, there can be no doubt: finite spirits having had each its determinate time, and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity as long as it exists. 3. Every particle of matter, to which no addition or subtraction has been made is the same. C 27. S 2.

Identity of vegetables consists in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts, united to the living body of the plant. C 27. S 4.

Animal identity consists in a fit organization of parts to a certain end. C 26. S 5.

Identity of man consists in a participation of the same continued life in succession, virtually united to the same organized body. C 27. S 6.

Consciousness alone makes personal identity. C 27. S 10.

Proportion is a relation, depending on the equality or excess of the same simple idea in several subjects; as whiter, sweeter, bigger, equal, more, &c. C 28. S 1.

Moral good and evil is the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law. The good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is reward or punishment. C 28. S 5.

The actions of men are regulated by three laws.— 1. The divine law, by which men judge whether their actions be sins or duties. 2d. The civil law, by which they judge whether they be criminal or innocent.— 3. The law of reputation or opinion, by which they judge whether they be virtues, or vices. C 28. S 7.

The divine law is the law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation. C 29. S 8.

The civil law is the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it. C 28. S 9.

The law of opinion or reputation includes every thing that is laudable. C 28. S 10.

Virtue is every where what is thought praise worthy. C 28. S 11.

Commendation and discredit are the enforcements of *the law of* opinion. C 28. S 12.

All relations terminate in simple ideas. When a man says honey is *sweeter* than wax, it is plain that his thoughts in this relation, terminate in this simple idea *sweetness*. C 28. S 18.

Simple ideas are clear, when such as a well ordered perception would present. C 29. S 22.

The cause of obscurity in simple ideas, arises either from dull organs, transient impressions, or a weakness in the memory. C 29. S 3.

No ideas can be confused but in reference to names. C 29. S 6.

When a complex idea is made up of two few simple ones, it is liable to confusion. Thus he that has an idea made up of the simple ones, barely of a beast with spots has but a confused idea of a Leopard, it not being sufficiently distinguished from a Lynx, and several others. C 26. S 7.

A complex idea is confused, when the simple ones that go to the making it up are not sufficiently distinct. C 29. S 8.

When any of our ideas are uncertain, or undetermined, confusion is the consequence. C 23. S 11.

Complex ideas may be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another. If a man who speaks of *Chiliaëdron*, or a body of a thousand sides, the idea of the figure may be very confused, though that of the number be very distinct. C 29. S 13.

Real ideas are such as have a foundation in nature, or conformity with their archetypes. C 30. S 1.

All simple ideas are real. C 30. S 2.

Complex ideas are voluntary combinations of the mind. Else all men's ideas of justice, and gold, would be the same. C 30. S 3.

Mixed modes if made up of consistent ideas are real. C 30. S 4.

Ideas of substances are real, when they agree with the existence of things. C 30. S 5.

Adequate ideas are those which perfectly represent their archetypes, for which the mind supposes them taken. C 31. S 1.

Simple ideas are adequate. C 31. S 2.

All modes are adequate. C 31. S 3.

Modes in reference to names are not always adequate. C 31. S 4.

Ideas of substances as referred to real essences are not adequate. C 31. S 6.

Ideas of substances, as collections of their qualities are all inadequate. C 31. S 8.

Ideas and words in a metaphysical sense are true. C 32. S 2.

Ideas referred to any thing extraneous may be true or false. C 32. S 5.

Men's ideas are usually referred to other men's ideas; real existence, and supposed real essences. C 32. S 5.

To shorten the way to knowledge, ideas are thrown into kinds and sorts. C 32. S 6.

Simple ideas are least likely to be false in reference to others of the same name, because a man by his own observation, and daily experience, may easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are, which their several names that are in common use stand for; and hence *the name red is scarcely* ever applied to the idea of *green, &c.* C 32. S 9.

Ideas of mixed modes are most likely to be false, in reference to others of the same name. It is difficult to determine several actions: justice is frequently denominated cruelty; prodigality, liberality. C 32. S 10.

In reference to the real existence of things, no ideas can be false, but complex ones of substances. C 32. S 13.

Truth is the joining or separating of signs, according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for, and always includes some affirmation, or negation, express, or tacit. C 32. S 19.

Men's ideas run together as it were in a gang; from hence arises the association of ideas. C 33. S 5.

The connection of ideas in men's minds, come either voluntarily, or by chance; hence the difference in men's ideas. C 33. S 6.

The wrong connection of ideas in men's minds, is a great cause of error. C 33. S 9.

Time cures some disorders in the mind, which reason cannot, by separating the idea of a loss, from the sense of an enjoyment.* C 33. S 13.

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* ———— ask the faithful youth,
Why the cold urn of her whom long he loved,
So often fills his arms, so often draws
His lonely footsteps at the silent hour,
To pay the mournful tribute of his tears?
Oh! he will tell thee that the wealth of worlds,
Should ne'er seduce his bosom to forego
That sacred hour, when stealing from the noise
Of care and envy, sweet remembrance soothes
With virtue's kindest looks, his aching breast,
And turns his tears to rapture.

AKENSIDE.

See this subject admirably treated in Darwin's Zoonomia. Vol.
Page 372.

BOOK III.

A word is a sensible sign of an idea necessary towards the intercourse of mankind. C 2. S 1.

Words in themselves signify nothing, yet by use, readily excite ideas. C 2. S 6.

The signification of words is perfectly arbitrary; but a man speaks unintelligibly if his words do not excite the same ideas in the mind of another, which they stand for in his own. C 2. S 8.

It is impossible that every thing in particular should have a distinct peculiar name, because it is beyond the power of human capacity, to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things to be met with. C 3. S 2.

Besides persons, countries, rivers, cities, mountains, and other the like distinctions of place, have usually found peculiar names, because it is necessary frequently to mark them particularly, and on this account race horses have their proper names. C 3. S 5.

General words are made by abstraction. C 3. S 6.

Words are defined according to genus, not because it is the best, but the shortest way. C 3. S 10.

Abstract ideas are essences of the genera, and species of things. C. 3. S 12.

The sorting of general terms under names, is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion, from the similitude it observes among them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind with names annexed to them as patterns, or forms, to which as particular things existing are found to agree, *they come to be of* that species, have that denomi*nation, or are put into* that class. C 3. S 13.

Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence. C 3. S 14.

Essence is the being of a thing whereby it is, what it is. In substances it is the real, but commonly unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend. C 3. S 15.

Between the nominal essence of a thing, and its name there is a near connection. The name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being, but what has the essence, whereby it answers the abstract idea, whereof that particular name is the sign. C 3. S 16.

The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definitions ; the names of all complex ideas are. C 4. S 4.

A definition is the shewing the meaning of a word by other words not synonimous. C 4. S 6.

Simple ideas are undefinable, because uncompounded. C 4. S 7.

The names of mixed modes and relations are made arbitrarily, and without patterns. C 5. S 3.

Mixed modes are made by first taking a certain number of ideas. Secondly, By giving them a connection, and making them into one idea. Thirdly, By tying them together by a name. C 5. S 4.

In mixed modes it is the name by which they are tied, that determines the species. C 5. S 10.

Complex ideas of mixed modes, being the workmanship of the understanding for the conveniency of brief expression, are commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of natural substances, and often *unite into one* abstract idea, things that have no *coherence.* The mixed mode procession,—what a gre mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, sounds, does it not contain? C 5. § 13.

The names of mixed modes are almost always got before the ideas they stand for are, because being made up for a number of ideas, it is difficult to frame one that we have not before heard. C 5. S 15.

The common names of substances stand for sorts, that is, being made signs of such complex ideas wherein several substances agree, by which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and signified by one name. C 6. S 1.

The essence of each sort is the abstract idea to which the name is annexed. The nominal essence of gold, is that complex idea the word gold stands for; as a body yellow; of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. C 6. S 2.

The nominal and real essences of substances differ. C 6. S 3.

Our abstract ideas of substances determine the species. There are creatures it is said, that with language, reason, and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails. If it be asked whether these are all men, it is plain the question refers only to the nominal essence; for those of them to whom the definition of the word man, or the complex idea signified by the names, agrees, are men, and the others not. C 6. S 22.

The species is not distinguished by generation. C 6. S 23.

The specific essences of substances are made by the mind, and are on that account very various and uncertain. C 6. S 26.

Essences of species under the same name are very fferent in the ideas of different persons. C 6. S 31.

Our ideas of substances according as they are more general, so they are more incomplete and partial. C 6. S 32.

Each abstract idea with a name to it, makes a distinct species. C 6. S 38.

The species of artificial things is less confused than that of natural ones, because the name is supposed to import no other essence than what is certainly to be known. C 6. S 40.

Things artificial as well as natural, are of a distinct species. C 6. S 44.

In the proper use of particles, consists the art of speaking well. C 7. S 2.

Particles shew what relation the mind has to its own thoughts. C 7. S 4.

Instance in the particle, *but*; first *but*, to say no more: here it intimates a stop of the mind, in the course it was going before it came to the end of it. Secondly, I saw *but* two plants: here it shews that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other. Thirdly, You pray, *but* it is not that God would bring you to the true religion. Fourthly, *But* that he would confirm you in your own: the first of these *buts*, intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shews that the mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it. Fifthly, All animals have sense, *but* a dog is an animal. Here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the minor of a syllogism. C 7. S 5.

Abstract ideas are not predicable one of another, be*cause they* are each distinct. A man is an animal, b it would be nonsense to say humanity is animality. C 8. S 1.

There are four causes of the imperfection of words. 1. When the ideas they stand for are very complex. 2. Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connection in nature, to rectify and adjust them by. 3. Where the signification of a word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be known. 4. Where the signification of a word, and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same. C 9. S 5.

The names of simple ideas are the least doubtful. C 9. S 18.

After simple ideas, the names of simple modes are the least doubtful. C 9. S 19.

The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances. C 9. S 20.

One great abuse of words is, the getting names without the determinate ideas which they stand for. C 10. S 4.

Inconstancy in the use of words is another great abuse of themselves. C 10. S 5.

Logic being a dispute about words, has more contributed to their abuse than any thing else. C 10. S 7.

The taking words for things is a great abuse of them. C 10. S 14.

The ends of language in our discourse with others are these three. 1. To make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another. 2. To do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible. 3. Thereby to convey the knowledge of things. Language is either abused or deficient when it fails in any of these three. C 10. S 23.

In search after truth, care must be taken to avoid all *obscurity,* doubtfulness, and equivocation, to which *ords are commonly* very liable. C 11. S 3.

To remedy the defects of speech, no word should be used without a clear and determinate idea. C 11. S 8.

As the precise and moral meaning of words is to be found out, morality is capable of demonstration. C 11. S 15.

Definitions conduce to the making moral discourses clear. C 11. S 17.

The definitions of mixed modes are necessary, as it is the only way whereby the significations of most of them can be known with certainty. C 11. S 18.

The leading qualities of substances are best got by shewing them, because they are difficult to be described in words. C 11. S 21.

The ideas of their powers are best got by definition. C 11. S 22.

Words should always be used in the same sense. C 11. S 26.

Should a variation be made from the common acceptation of a word, that variation should always be carefully explained. C 11. S 27.

BOOK IV.

OUR knowledge is only conversant about our ideas. C 1. S 1.

Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any four ideas. C 1. S 2.

This agreement is fourfold. 1. Identity or diversity. 2. Relation. 3. Co-existence, or necessary connection. 4. *Real existence.* C 1. S 3.

Identity or diversity is the first act of the mind towards the perception of its ideas, to know each what it is, and thereby to find out the difference. C 1. S 4.

Relation is the perception how two ideas stand in regard to each other. C 1. S 5.

Co-existence, or non co-existence, has a particular reference to substances.—Malleableness and fusibility in gold are co-existent ideas. C 1. S 6.

There are two sorts of knowledge, actual and habitual: actual knowledge is the present view the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas: when that view is not present, but stored up in the memory, it is habitual knowledge. C 1. S 8.

Of our habitual knowledge there are two degrees:—

The one is of such truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation that is between those ideas. The other is of such truths whereof the mind, having been convinced, retains the conviction without the proofs. C 1. S 9.

There are two degrees of our knowledge, intuitive and demonstrative; when there is no need of a proof, it is intuitive. C 2. S 1.

When a proof is required our knowledge is then demonstrative. C 2. S 2.

The intervening ideas which serve to shew the agreement of any two others are called proofs, and where the agreement or disagreement is by these means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called demonstration. C 2. S 3.

Demonstrative knowledge is not so clear as intuitive. *C 2. S 4.*

Each step of demonstrative knowledge must have
uitive evide

In comparing the equality or excess, the modes of number have every difference clear and perceivable, which not being the case in any thing else, has given rise to the idea that number alone is capable of demonstration. C 2. S 10.

Whatever comes short of intuition and demonstration, is either faith, or opinion. C 2. S 14.

Knowledge is not always clear when the ideas are so. C 2. S 15.

Our knowledge extends not beyond the agreement, or disagreement of our ideas. C 3. S 2.

Demonstrative knowledge does not extend itself to all the relations of our ideas, because we cannot always find such mediums, as will connect one to another, with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction. C 3. S 4.

The extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. C 3. S 6.

Intuitive knowledge in regard to identity and diversity, extends as far as our ideas. C 3. S 8.

Knowledge and co-existence reach a very little way. C 3. S 9.

Because the connection between the most simple ideas is unknown. C 3. S 10.

A great cause of ignorance is the want of a discoverable connection between our ideas. C 3. S 28.

When we have adequate ideas, for want of tracing them, we are frequently in ignorance. C 3. S 30.

Knowledge if founded on the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of ideas, is full as certain, whether *those ideas* have a foundation in reality or not. C 4. S 1.

Where ideas agree with the reality of things, knowledge is not then visionary. C 4. S 3.

All simple as well as complex ideas (except those of substances) want no conformity necessary to real knowledge. B 4. S 2. & 5.

The reality of mathematical knowledge, depends upon the agreement of our ideas with things. C 4. S 6.

For the attainment of knowledge and certainty, it is requisite that we have determined ideas, and to make our knowledge real, it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes. C 4. S 8.

Moral knowledge will not be the less true, because moral ideas are of our own making and naming. C 4. S 9.

Mis-naming does not disturb the certainty of knowledge. C 4. S 10.

Our knowledge of substances is real, as far as it agrees with the archetypes without us. C 4. S 12.

Truth is the joining or separating of signs as the things signified by them agree or disagree, one with another. C 5. S 2.

Falsehood is the marking down in words, the agreement or disagreement of things, otherwise than it is. C 5. S 9.

Moral truth is speaking things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though not according to reality. Metaphysical truth is the real existence of things conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. C. 5. S 11.

General truths are hardly to be understood, but in *verbal propositions*: the treating of words is therefore *necessary to* knowledge. C 6. S 2.

Certainty of truth is when words are so put together, as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the idea they stand for. Certainty of knowledge, is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. C 6. S 3.

No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence of each species mentioned, is not known. C 6. S 4.

Propositions concerning substances, are on this account scarcely ever true. C 6. S 5.

As far as we can trace the co-existent qualities, so far universal propositions extend. Could any one discover a necessary connection between malleableness, and the colour or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex idea signified by that name, he might make a certain universal proposition concerning gold in this respect; and the real truth of this proposition—That all gold is malleable, would be certain. C 6. S 3.

General knowledge consists in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas. C 6. S 13.

General propositions are only capable of certainty when they stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement as there expressed is to be discovered. C. 6. S 16.

When the agreement or disagreement of our ideas is seen without the help of any thing else, knowledge is then self-evident. C 7. S 2.

All propositions in regard to identity and diversity, are equally self-evident. C 7. S 4.

In regard to real existence, as that has no connection with any other of our ideas but that of ourselves, and a *first being,we* have concerning the existence of other b*ings not so* much as demonstrative knowledge. C 7.

Our knnowledge is not founded on maxims, because they are not the truths we are first acquainted with. C 7. S 9.

The only use general maxims have, is to silence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. C 7. S 11.

Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of words, may prove contradictions. C 7. S 12.

Trifling propositions bring little increase to our knowledge. Identical ones,—none. C 8. S 2.

When a part of a complex idea is predicated of the whole, there is no increase of knowledge. As for instance, lead is a metal. C 8. S 4.

General propositions being abstract, do not concern existence. C 9. S 1.

We have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition, the knowledge of God by demonstration, and of other things by sensation. C 9. S 2.

Man has a clear perception of his own existence. C 10. S 2.

Man is certain that a real being must be produced by something, which (supposing it the first cause) must have existed from eternity. C 10. S 3.

This first cause must have in perfection what it bestows on finite beings, and therefore all powerful. C 10. S 4.

And for the same reason all knowing. C 10. S 5.

From the consideration of ourselves, we find out that there is an eternal, most powerful and most knowing being, which whether any one will call God or no, matters not. C 10. S 6.

There are but two sorts of being,—cogitative, and in-*ogitative : it is* natural to suppose that an incogitative *ing cannot* produce a cogitative one. C 10. S 10.

If therefore it be evident that something necessarily must have existed from eternity, it is also as evident that something must necessarily be a cogitative being. C 10. S 18.

Matter is not co eternal with an eternal mind. C 10. S 18.

The perception of things is produced in us by external causes affecting our senses; those that want the organs of any sense, can never have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds. C 11. S 4.

Knowledge does not take its rise from maxims. C 12. S 1.

The good success it seemed to have in mathematics, gave rise to the opinion, that the sciences were built upon certain *precognita.* C 12. S 2.

The comparison of clear and distinct ideas is the foundation of all knowledge. C 12. S 3.

A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts to our abstract ideas is the best method of advancing knowledge. C 12. S 7.

Hypotheses do not advance our knowledge, but if well made are great helps to the memory. C 12. S 13.

The art of finding out those intermediate ideas which may shew the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, is an advancement to knowledge. C 12. S 14.

On those intermediate ideas the certainty of mathematics is founded. C 12. S 15.

Knowledge is not wholly voluntary. C 13. S 1.

The application of our knowledge is voluntary, but the will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or the other. C 13. S 2.

Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers, and taken the pains to compare, *one*, *two* and *three*, to *six*, cannot chuse but know they are equal. C 13. S 3.

Our knowledge being short and scanty, we supply the use of it by judgment. C 14. S 1.

Judgment, is the taking any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. C 14. S 3.

Probability is the appearance of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, but upon fallible proofs. C 15. S 1.

There are two grounds of probability. First. The conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. Secondly. The testimony of others,—in which is to be considered. 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of an author, where it is a testimony out of book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies. C 15. S 4.

Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which produces certain knowledge, the mind ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make for or against any probable proposition, before it assents or dissents from it. C 15. S 5.

The grounds of probability ought to be the measure by which different degrees of assent should be regulated. C 16. S 1.

The concurrent experience of all other men with our *own*, produces assurance approaching to knowledge. *C 16. S 6.*

*Unquestion*able testimony and experience for the *ost part* produce confidence. C 16. S 7.

When any particular matter of fact in things indifferent is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unquestionable witnesses, there our assent is unavoidable. C 16. S 1.

Testimonies and common experience clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of probability. C 16. S 9.

The farther traditional testimonies are removed, the weaker their proof is. C 16. S 10.

In things which sense cannot discover, analogy is the great rule of probability. C 16. S 12.

Contrary experience does not lesson the testimony of miracles; but this is the only instance. C 16. S 13.

Reason is a faculty in man whereby he is distinguished from beasts. C 17. S 1.

Reason consists in the perception of the connection there is between the ideas in each step of a deduction, on which it gives or withholds its assent. C 17. S 2.

The four degrees of reason are,—1. The discovery of proofs. 2. The regular and methodical disposition of them, so as to make their connection and force to be plainly and easily perceived. 3. The perceiving the connection. 4. The making a right conclusion. C 17. S 3.

Our reason is defective,—First. Where our ideas fail. Secondly. Because of the obscurity, confusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about. Thirdly. For the want of intermediate ideas. Fourthly. By proceeding upon wrong principles. Fifthly. Because of doubtful terms. C 17. S 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

The principal act of ratiocination is, the finding the *agreement or disagreement* of two ideas one with another, *by the* intervention of a third. C 17. S 18.

There are four sorts of arguments made use of to claim assent. 1. To alledge the opinions of celebrated men, is the *argumentum ad verecundiam.* 2. To require the adversary to admit what is brought as a proof, or assign a better, is the *argumentum ad ignorantiam.* 3. To press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions, is the *argumentum ad hominem.* 4. To use proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability, is the *argumentum ad judicium.* C 17. S 19. 20. 21. 22.

According to reason, are such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection; above reason, are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot, by reason, derive from those principles. C 17. S 23.

Faith is a firm assent of the mind which cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason, so cannot be opposite to it. C 17. S 24.

Reason as contra-distinguished to faith, is the discovery of the certainty, or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction. Faith is the assent to any proposition not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God in some extraordinary way of communication. C 18. S 2.

No new simple idea can be conveyed into the mind by traditional revelation. C 18. S 3.

Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason. C 18. S 5.

Revelation should be admitted in matters where reason cannot judge. C 18. S 9.

If the provinces of faith and reason be not kept distinct by boundaries, no enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted. C 18. S 11.

Enthusiasm is the laying by reason, and setting up revelation in its stead. C 19. S 3.

Immediate revelation is adopted as being an easier way to establish the truth of a proposition than reason. C 19. S 5.

Enthusiasm fails of evidence that the proposition is from God. C 19. S 11.

Revelation must be judged of by reason. C 19. S 4.

Error is a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true. There are four causes of error. 1. Want of proofs. 2. Want of ability to use them. 3. Want of will to use them. 4. Wrong measures of probability. C 20. S 1.

The following are the causes of wrong measures of probability. 1. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles. 2. Received hypotheses. 3. Predominant passions or inclinations. 4. Authority. C 20. S 7.

There is a threefold division of the sciences. First. The knowledge of things as they are in their own proper beings, their constitutions, properties, and operations: this is natural philosophy. C 21. S 1.

Secondly. The skill of applying our powers and actions rightly for the attainment of things, good and useful: this is ethics. C 21. S 3.

Thirdly. The doctrine of signs, the most usual whereof being words, is termed logic. C 21. S 4.

This is the first division of the objects of knowledge *C 21. S 5.*

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